INTRODUCTION
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has long supported a brokerage customer's right to choose arbitration as a means to resolve customer disputes fairly and efficiently, and as a critical component of investor protection.
1 Under an SEC-approved rule, broker-dealers, all of which must be members of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), 2 a securities self-regulatory organization (SRO), have an obligation to submit to arbitration at the demand of a customer. FINRA Rule 12200 provides that member firms must arbitrate a claim if "requested by a customer," " [t] he dispute is between a customer and a member or associated person of a member; and . . . [t] he dispute arises in connection with the business activities of the member or the associated person." 3 To prevent investors from having a unilateral right to demand arbitration, virtually all brokerage firms include provisions in their form contracts with retail customers requiring arbitration of customers' disputes in an SRO forum, primarily FINRA's Office of Dispute Resolution. 4 Because the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 5 declares the validity, irrevocability, and A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an enforceability of arbitration agreements, which reflects "an emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution," 6 courts enforce these predispute arbitration agreements (PDAAs) strictly according to their terms. 7 In 2010, although Congress, as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), 8 expressly authorized the SEC to prohibit PDAAs, 9 the provision designates no deadline for action, and, as of 2016, the SEC has taken no action pursuant to this express power. 10 While some scholars criticize the fairness of mandatory or "forced" 11 arbitration, particularly in the consumer context, 12 I have argued that FINRA arbitration is a fair and efficient forum for the resolution of investor disputes. 13 In particular, arbitrators can decide investors' disputes on grounds agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
Id. § 2. The final phrase of the section constitutes the FAA's "savings clause," which preserves common law contract defenses to challenge arbitration agreements. 15 Broker-dealers, virtually all of whom are regulated by FINRA, 16 also argue that arbitration is fair to investors and have lobbied long and hard to prevent federal regulators from prohibiting mandatory arbitration clauses in customer agreements. 17 It is therefore surprising that, for large-dollar-value disputes primarily involving institutional (as opposed to individual) investors, broker-dealers frequently resist arbitration. 18 Respondent firms sometimes thwart arbitration by contending that the claimant is not a "customer" of the FINRA member firm within the meaning of FINRA Customer Code Rule 12200. This contention has fallen flat in many cases, as courts have expanded the definition of "customer" to include not only traditional brokerage customers, but also issuers that purchase other services offered by broker-dealers, such as investment banking and underwriting services. clauses operate as a "waiver" of the customer's right to demand arbitration under Rule 12200. Those clauses-which drafting parties likely included at a time when courts had not yet applied Rule 12200 to broker-dealers acting in an underwriting capacity-typically provide that "all actions and proceedings" related to disputes arising out of the agreements "shall be brought in [a designated court]." 21 The clauses examined by courts thus far contain no reference to arbitration, whether with language of waiver or otherwise. Rather, the agreements underlying those transactions more likely included these types of clauses because the drafting parties assumed disputes would be pursued in court and the clause functioned as a choice of venue provision.
The federal appellate courts, applying contract law, currently are split on the question of whether a forum selection clause supersedes the firms' obligation to arbitrate. 22 Some courts reason that parties can contract out of the firms' "default" obligation to arbitrate, and enforce the forum selection clause as a superseding agreement. 23 Other courts rule that the forum selection clause is not specific enough to supersede the obligation to arbitrate since the clause does not mention arbitration. 24 The different outcomes reflect the courts' application of similar principles of contract interpretation and arbitrability, which are difficult to reconcile. [Vol. 10
In 2010, as part of Dodd-Frank, Congress amended section 29(a) of the Exchange Act to include the phrase "or of any rule of a self-regulatory organization." 28 This amendment was part of Congress' effort to harmonize the securities laws so that investors were as equally protected from conduct prohibited by SROs as from conduct prohibited by securities exchanges. 29 Thus, since 2010, section 29(a) explicitly invalidates provisions in brokerage agreements that require customers to waive compliance with the FINRA rules.
If courts interpret a forum selection clause as superseding firms' duty to arbitrate, those courts are permitting firms to force customers to waive compliance with their right to demand arbitration under FINRA Rule 12200. This contradicts the SEC's long-held position that the option to arbitrate for retail investors is critical to maintain and protect those investors who lack bargaining power and resources relative to broker-dealers. 30 Although courts thus far have enforced forum selection clauses only in the context of institutional investors (rather than individuals) as customers, their rationale could easily be expanded to individual retail investors.
The Supreme Court has interpreted section 29(a) to apply to waivers of substantive rights arising under the Exchange Act, 31 and has held that a mandatory arbitration provision forcing customers to waive their right to proceed in court does not violate section 29(a). 32 However, broker-dealers have no obligation under the securities laws or regulations to submit customer disputes to court for resolution, and therefore customers are not waiving a substantive right actionable under section 29(a). 33 Is, then, the inverse true as well: if the predispute choice of court can be waived, can the post-dispute choice of arbitration be waived, too? In other words, is the right to demand arbitration of a customer dispute a nonwaivable right under section 29(a)?
This Article argues that the right to choose arbitration in the securities industry, as a device to further investor protection, is a right that firms cannot force investors to waive. Part I of this Article provides the statutory framework governing broker-dealers' agreements with their customers. Part II describes how courts have applied this framework to forum selection clauses in broker-dealers' agreements with customers in recent years. Part III argues that the anti-waiver provision of the Exchange Act bars courts from Id . at 228 (stating that the Exchange Act's section 27, which provides federal district courts with original jurisdiction for suits arising under the Act, "itself does not impose any duty with which persons trading in securities must 'comply'").
enforcing these forum selection clauses in the face of a customer's choice of arbitration.
I. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
In the wake of the stock market crash of 1929, Congress passed the Exchange Act 34 to protect investors from abuses in the capital markets. 35 In addition to creating the SEC as the primary federal securities regulator, the Exchange Act also set up a system of industry self-regulation to further protect investors and serve the public interest. 36 Congress designated national securities exchanges (e.g., the New York Stock Exchange) as SROs because they already existed as organizations that proscribed rules to govern their members.
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A. EXCHANGE ACT SECTION 29(A)
Since its enactment, the Exchange Act has included an anti-waiver provision. Section 29(a) originally stated that "[a]ny condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of this or of any rule or regulation thereunder, or of any rule of an exchange required, shall be void." 38 Legislative history of the original provision is scant, 39 but it seems apparent that, in 1934, Congress sought to preclude any entity or individual from circumventing the full force of the new federal securities laws by requiring a weaker party to waive the protections that the Act was designed to provide for investors. 40 Congress wanted to ensure that securities firms did not exert their market power on investors by contracting around their new In 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act amended the anti-waiver provision by striking "an exchange required thereby" and inserting "a self-regulatory organization."
42 Thus, section 29(a) now explicitly invalidates provisions in brokerage agreements that require customers to waive compliance with FINRA rules, whereas before Dodd-Frank, the express language of the statute appeared to apply to waivers of rules of only securities exchanges.
The animating purpose of the 2010 amendment to section 29(a) is as mysterious as the origin of the section itself. The section in Dodd-Frank containing the amendment bore the heading "Equal Treatment of SelfRegulatory Organization Rules." 43 The Senate Report for the amendment states its purpose was to "provide[] equal treatment for the rules of all SROs under Section 29(a)."
44 Congress wanted to harmonize the securities laws so that rules of all SROs have equal force to those of exchanges (which are also SROs), so as to maximize investor protection. This made sense in an era in which FINRA had gained power and prestige as a securities regulator, and reached all broker-dealers, unlike the exchanges, which could regulate only its members, a far smaller subset of broker-dealers.
The Supreme Court has interpreted the anti-waiver provision in the context of a mandatory arbitration clause in a broker-dealer's customer's account agreement. What the antiwaiver provision of § 29(a) forbids is enforcement of agreements to waive "compliance" with the provisions of the statute. But § 27 itself does not impose any duty with which persons trading in securities must "comply." By its terms, § 29(a) only prohibits waiver of the substantive obligations imposed by the Exchange Act. Because § 27 does not impose any statutory duties, its waiver does not constitute a waiver of "compliance with any provision" of the Exchange Act under § 29(a). 51 Thus, the Court suggests that "substantive obligations" under the Exchange Act that cannot be waived are provisions that impose a duty on a regulated entity.
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In rejecting the McMahons' second argument that their "arbitration agreement effects an impermissible waiver of the substantive protections of the Exchange Act" because it resulted from broker overreaching, 53 the Court repeated a phrase it first penned two years earlier when deciding the protections afforded by the statute and its rules are so important that Congress would not permit parties to negotiate deals that weakened the statutory framework. While the congressional purpose may have been at least partly protective, reflecting a concern that the more sophisticated party might persuade the less sophisticated party to give up his rights, Congress also must have been concerned about the national interest and the importance of federal regulation for the overall fairness and effectiveness of the securities markets."). The following section describes the provision of the Exchange Act that authorizes the SEC to monitor SROs and their dispute resolution programs to ensure protection of investors.
53.
B. EXCHANGE ACT SECTION 15A
In 1938, Congress amended the Exchange Act to authorize the registration of nonexchange, national securities associations as SROs to regulate brokers in the over-the-counter market.
62 FINRA-now the largest independent regulator for all securities firms doing business in the United States-is the only registered national securities association under section 15A of the Exchange Act.
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In 1975, Congress again amended the Exchange Act, this time to give the SEC broad new powers over all SROs, including the power to review all of their proposed rules and to require them to adopt, change, or repeal any rules.
64 Through this power, the SEC exercises oversight of FINRA's activities, including operation of its arbitration forum, the largest dispute resolution forum in the securities industry. 65 The Exchange Act requires FINRA to adopt rules that may be designed for a variety of purposes, ranging from preventing "fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices" to promoting "just and equitable principles of trade," and "in general, [protecting] investors and the public interest." 66 FINRA must file proposed rule changes with the SEC, and, before approving them, the SEC must publish notice and provide interested persons an opportunity to comment on the proposals. 67 The SEC can approve FINRA's rules, after a public comment period, if it finds they are consistent with the requirements of the Exchange Act and are designed to protect investors and the public interest. 68 In addition, the SEC may, on its own provisions because English law provided "adequate substitutes" for federal securities laws); Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 148 F.3d 1285, 1287-88 (11th Cir. 1998) (recognizing it is a "close question," but following the "weight of circuit authority").
61. The SEC has long viewed the option of securities arbitration for investors as an important component of its investor protection mandate. Indeed, since its creation, the SEC has urged the SROs it regulates to provide an alternative dispute resolution forum for customers. 70 In the mid-1970s, the SEC proclaimed the need for a nationwide investor dispute resolution system to handle small claims and worked with the SROs, industry representatives, and investor groups to develop arbitration rules to achieve that result. 71 In the 1980s, the SEC filed several amicus briefs with courts expressing its strong support for SRO arbitration, as long as the forums followed SEC-approved arbitration procedures and enforced all SRO rules designed to protect investors.
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The SEC intensified its oversight of securities arbitration after McMahon, when SRO arbitration became the principal forum for resolving customers' disputes with their brokers. 73 Likewise, since McMahon, FINRA has engaged in ongoing review and reform of its arbitration rules 74 "for the continued improvement of securities industry arbitration as a fair, expeditious, and economical means for the resolution of disputes."
75 Among other things, the SEC now prohibits FINRA member firms from "having agreements with customers that limit or contradict the rules of any SRO or limit the ability of a party to file any claim in arbitration. . . ." 76 The approval order for this provision explained that one of its purposes was to prevent member firms from "limit[ing] SRO forums otherwise available to parties." 77 The next section discusses the FINRA rule that imposes a duty on brokerdealers to offer investors an arbitration forum.
NASD Notice to Members, 89-21 Proposed Amendment Re: Predispute Arbitration Clauses
C. FINRA RULE 12200: CUSTOMERS' RIGHT TO DEMAND ARBITRATION
FINRA's rules impose a duty on its member firms and their associated persons to arbitrate a dispute at the demand of a customer, even in the absence of an arbitration agreement. Under current FINRA Rule 12200, a FINRA member firm must arbitrate a claim if "requested by a customer,"
78 "[t]he dispute is between a customer and a member or associated person of a member; and . . . Thus, FINRA deems this right worthy of enforcing through disciplinary action.
As a threshold issue, because FINRA does not define "customer," courts have struggled to come up with a precise definition. While FINRA member firms historically have acknowledged that investors with brokerage accounts were "customers" within the meaning of Rule 12200, those firms challenged arbitration proceedings brought by others who did not have accounts, but had purchased other types of financial services from broker-dealers. Some circuit courts have concluded that a customer is "a non-broker and non-dealer who purchases commodities or services from a FINRA member in the course of the member's FINRA-regulated business activities. reviewing a long line of prior Second Circuit decisions on the subject, 82 the Second Circuit refined "the precise boundaries of the FINRA meaning of 'customer,'" and ruled that "a 'customer' under FINRA Rule 12200 is one who, while not a broker or dealer, either (1) purchases a good or service from a FINRA member, or (2) has an account with a FINRA member." 83 Significantly, this duty to arbitrate upon the demand of a customer has been imposed on brokerage firms since the 1800s. 84 In the mid-1800s, the Arbitration Committee of the New York Stock and Exchange Board (the Board), the predecessor to the New York Stock Exchange, accepted jurisdiction over nonmember customer disputes with member firms. 85 The Board did this to ensure that nonmembers-that is, investors-trusted the Board and had confidence in its member brokers to conduct themselves honestly. As one scholar studying this history observed: "The Board cited this nonmember edge with some pride in its dealings with the outside world. Investors had more assurance of the honesty of members than other brokers, it argued, because members were aware of how much easier it would be to force them to comply with their contracts."
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In 1869, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) amended its constitution to expressly provide to investors the right to demand arbitration of disputes with its member firms, even in the absence of a PDAA. 87 Archival records indicate that investor protection goals animated the NYSE's grant of this right. (1869) (establishing an "Arbitration Committee, to consist of nine members, whose duty it shall be to investigate and decide all claims and matters of difference arising between members of the Exchange; they shall also adjudicate such claims as may be preferred against members by nonmembers, when such non-members shall agree to abide by the rules of the New York Stock Exchange, in such cases provided"); Id. BY-LAWS ART. LII ("Any person not a member of the Exchange shall have the right to bring a claim arising from any transaction against a member of said Exchange, before the Arbitration Committee . . . ."); Norman S. Poser, Making Securities Arbitration Work, 50 S.M.U. L. REV. 277, 281 (1996) ("The NYSE Constitution of 1869 not only provided for arbitration of 'all claims and matters of difference' between members but also gave non-members the right to arbitrate disputes with members if they agreed to abide by the rules of the Exchange.").
88. See Gross, The History of Securities Arbitration, supra note 1, at 179.
In 1935, the SEC recognized this right just after its own formation, when it gained regulatory authority over the exchanges. 89 In a memorandum to the NYSE, the Chairman of the SEC stated: "[t]he right to arbitration before the arbitration committee of the exchange is at present granted to any customer regardless of the contract between the member and the customer." 90 To address its concerns regarding the composition and neutrality of arbitration panels for those customer arbitrations, the SEC recommended to the NYSE that it maintain this right for customers, but also provide an option for arbitration before independent arbitral tribunals rather than just before the NYSE.
91 Though renumbered as various provisions over the years, the right ultimately found its home in NYSE Constitution Art. XI and NYSE Arbitration Rule 600(a).
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In 1972, FINRA's predecessor, the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), which had started an arbitration program in 1969, adopted an identical rule-which ultimately became (now-retired) NASD Rule 10301 and (then) FINRA Rule 12200-providing the same right to customers who have disputes with NASD member firms and their associated persons. 93 When it first proposed the rule to its members, NASD explained that it had gained the necessary experience of running an arbitration program, and sought to establish a uniform dispute resolution system for industry-related disputes by adopting a rule identical to NYSE Rule 600. 94 In its notice to members, the NASD offered four reasons for seeking this rule change: 
NYSE Rule 600(a) provided:
Any dispute, claim or controversy between a customer or non-member and a member, allied member, member organization and/or associated person, arising in connection with the business of such member, allied member, member organization and/or associated person, in connection with his activities as an associated person shall be arbitrated under the Constitution and Rules of the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. as provided by any duly executed and enforceable written agreement or upon the demand of the customer or nonmember.
NYSE RULE 600(a). This clause of the NYSE Constitution has been described as "the most significant of the measures taken to implement the self-regulation contemplated by the 1934 Act." 94. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Special Report to NASD Members (Dec. 1970) (seeking "advice and suggestions of members" on proposal to adopt a type of mandatory arbitration at NASD "similar to that in use by the exchanges" requiring member firms to arbitrate at the request of a "professional or member of the public"). [Vol. 10
1. Arbitration provides a more expedient means of settling disputes than litigation. If a mandatory arbitration program exists, a firm can enter into a contract with more confidence, realizing that most disputes can be settled without tying up capital for long periods of time.
2. Mandatory arbitration costs a fraction of the expense needed to settle disputes in the courts.
3. Arbitrators are chosen because of their immediate familiarity with the securities business.
4. Mandatory arbitration under NASD rules would make procedures within the industry more uniform to provide an equal opportunity to settle disputes. 95 When the NYSE merged its enforcement and arbitration functions with the NASD in 2007, 96 NYSE Rule 600 was consolidated with NASD 10301 into today's FINRA Rule 12200. Thus, for almost 200 years, customers have had the right to demand arbitration of a dispute with a NYSE member firm, and since 1972 with every broker-dealer in the country.
Despite this time-honored right, brokerage firms now contend that they can force customers to waive that right via forum selection clauses. The next Part discusses whether courts have endorsed that argument.
II. THE CIRCUIT COURT SPLIT ON WHETHER RULE 12200 IS WAIVABLE
The circuit courts are currently split on whether the duty to arbitrate under FINRA Rule 12200 is waivable. Both the Second and Ninth Circuit have refused to compel a broker-dealer to arbitrate under Rule 12200 on the grounds that a forum selection clause in the disputants' agreements superseded the firm's duty to arbitrate. 97 
